Micro-video sharing is prevalent nowadays due to the rapid development of personal smart devices, fast growing of network bandwidth and the easy-to-use cloud computing. However, the microvideo sharing system is more vulnerable compared to the conventional video service model because of the vulnerability of the cloud and the hardware computing constraints of personal devices. Ensuring the security and privacy of the micro-videos has become critical for micro-video sharing systems. Recently, a number of encryption schemes have been proposed to protect the security of the micro-videos stored in the cloud. However, these approaches cannot support micro-video sharing functionality. Moreover, the encryptionbased method cannot provide the fine-grained access control on encrypted micro-videos. In this paper, we present a notion of fine-grained identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption to address the issue of fine-grained encrypted micro-video sharing. Further, we present a concrete scheme in the proposed notion and proved its semantic security. Performance and evaluation reveal that our scheme is practical and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of smart phones, more and more people are taking micro-videos to record and share things around. With the growth of individual's videos, people are facing a tough problem of personal video management and maintenance since it is very expensive and impractical for an individual to setup a service infrastructure. Cloud computing, which enables an user to outsource his videos with on-demand storage capability and low cost, is a promising technique to resolve the problem. In current cloud-based video storage and sharing architecture [1] in Fig 1, the data owner uploads his personal video to a third cloud service provider. Along the video, an access policy defines who is shared with the video is also uploaded. When a data user wants to access the video, he sends a request to the cloud server, then the cloud server returns the corresponding video if and only if the data user The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Derek Abbott . satisfies the access policy. However, it is unavoidable that the above mechanism also suffers from the security and privacy problems since video data is stored in a plaintext form in the cloud, which is not fully trusted by the video owner.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [2] is potential approach to ensure the data confidentiality as it simplifies the public key infrastructure. When the video data is encrypted using the identity-based encryption before it's uploaded to the cloud, video distributing is a basic demand for the video subscribing system. While the traditional IBE can guarantee the confidentiality of outsourced video, it is incapable for the data sharing functionality.
Here is an example solution to address the security issue by using traditional IBE. Suppose, in a Micro-Video Subscribing System, a video owner encrypts his video with an identitybased encryption, and then uploads the result ciphertext to the cloud. At some point, the video owner may want to share some specific video with a set of subscribers who have paid the video owner. In the traditional identity-based encryption scheme, the video owner should first download the encrypt videos and then decrypt them to obtain the underlying video data. Following that, the video owner encrypts the plaintext video using each subscriber's identity in the subscribers set. Such a phase does not scale well for the above video subscribing scenario as downloading video from the cloud server causes extra data maintenance on the cloud. This problem is even serious for smart phones due to the constrained computation and storage resource. A worse problem is that during the whole sharing phase, the video owner should be online as his private key is involved to decrypt the encrypted video. Additionally, the traditional identitybased encryption cannot support the fine-grained control on videos that the video owned wants to be shared. For example, the video owner may only want to share the video satisfying a specific policy. However the traditional identitybased encryption cannot support data match on encrypted ciphertext.
From the above Micro-Video Subscribing System scenario, though the traditional identity-based encryption can support data confidentiality, it is lack of fine-grained control on video sharing. The video owner has to download all the encrypted videos and decrypt them locally. However, such a process brings extra burden that is more critical for smart devices.
Naively, one may think that the video owner can store his private key in the cloud. However, in such a solution, the cloud server should be fully trusted. This is impractical since in the cloud computing circumstance the cloud server and the cloud users belong to different trust domains [3] , [4] .
A. RELATED WORK
The concept of identity-based encryption was fist introduced by Boneh and Franklin [2] . and Cocks [5] . It simplifies the public key infrastructure in traditional public key encryption because the user's identity acts as his public key. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [6] is a generalized identity-based encryption which enables fine-grained access control on the encrypted data. Attribute-based encryption can be categorized into ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) [7] and key policy ABE (KP-ABE) [8] . In a CP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is encrypted under an access policy P and the user's private key is described by an attribute set S. A user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if S satisfies P.
While it is reversed in the KP-ABE setting. Following their work, to achieve stronger security and efficiency, many improved ABE scheme were proposed [9] - [11] . To enable encrypted data sharing, Blaze et al. [12] introduced the notion of proxy re-encryption (PRE). In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a proxy with a re-encryption key can transform one's ciphertext to another user's ciphertext without knowing the plaintext. Ateniese et al. [13] proposed the first concrete PRE construction based on bilinear pairing. To overcome the heavy computation cost of bilinear pairing, Shao and Cao [14] and Lu and Li [15] proposed PRE schemes without pairings.
Later, Green and Ateniese [16] combined the notion of IBE and PRE and proposed an identity-based proxy re-encryption (IB-PRE) scheme. Huang et al. [17] leveraged the concept of identity-based proxy re-encryption to private online social network data sharing. To enable flexible control on the shared data, Shao et al. [18] and Ge et al. [19] extend the notion of IB-PRE to identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption (IB-CPRE) in which only ciphertexts satisfying a certain condition can be transformed. To achieve fine-grained access control, many attribute-based proxy re-encryption (AB-PRE) schemes were proposed [20] - [24] . Unfortunately, these approaches cannot scale well in the video subscribing scenario in which there are always a set of subscribers. In such a case, the cloud server needs to re-encrypt the original video ciphertext for every subscriber on the list.
In 2009, Chu et al. [25] proposed the notion of broadcast proxy re-encryption (BPRE), in which the proxy can convert a user's ciphertext to a set of users' ciphertext at a time. Later, Sun et al. [26] extended the notion of BPRE to the identity-based setting and proposed an identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption (IB-BPRE) scheme. To enable flexible control on the encrypted data that to be shared, Xu et al. [27] proposed a conditional identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption scheme, where only the ciphertexts that satisfying a certain condition can be further re-encrypted. Following their work, Chunpeng et al. [28] presented a revocable identity-based proxy re-encryption (IB-BPRE) where the revoked subscribers can be efficiently revoked. However, although these scheme can achieve the broadcast property of video sharing, they cannot support fine-grained control on the encrypted videos.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this work, we adopt the notion of identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption to the video subscribing system to keep the confidentiality of the video data. Our notion enables the video owner to share the encrypted videos with a set of subscribers at a time. Moreover, the data owner can achieve fine-grained access control on the encrypted videos. We propose a concrete fine grained identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption (ID-BPRE), analyze its security and prove its semantic security for our video subscribing system. The Performance and evaluation demonstrate that our scheme is practical without losing the efficiency. 
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we first present our fine grained video subscribing system architecture. Following that, we will describe the definition of proposed identity-based BPRE and its threat model in the video subscribing system.
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In the video subscribing system, shown in Fig 2, there are three entities, the video owner, the cloud server and a set of subscribers. The video owner is equipped with a smartphone with constrained computation and storage resource. The cloud server is third party cloud service provider with unlimited computing capability and storage (e.g. the Ali Cloud and Amazon Cloud). A set of subscribers who wants to view the videos shared by the video owner. The details of each entity are as follows.
• The video owner encrypt the micro-video and then upload the encrypted videos to the cloud. The video owner is also responsible for generating re-encryption keys for different sets of subscribers.
• When received the video request from a subscriber, the cloud re-encrypts the encrypted video with a reencryption key. And then, responses the subscriber with the re-encrypted ciphertext.
• The subscriber decrypts the re-encrypted video from the cloud with his own private key.
B. THREAT MODEL
In our video subscribing system, the video owner is thought to be honest. The cloud server is honest but curious that means he will execute the protocol honestly but curious to collect information to reveal the underlying video. The subscribers are malicious that want to acquire the video without authorized by the video owner. Moreover, the malicious subscribers may collude with the cloud server to reveal the video.
C. FINE-GRAINED IB-BPRE
In this section, we fist present an review of the access policy in our scheme. The access policy in our scheme is defined as an access tree T which was first introduced by Goyal et al. [8] . Definition 1 (Access Tree T ): For an access tree T , each non-leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. For each node x, num x is the number of its children and k x is its threshold value, then we have 0 < k x ≤ num x . When k x = num x , it is an AND gate, and when k x = 1, the threshold is an OR gate. For each leaf node x of the its threshold value k x = 1. The root of an access tree is set to be at depth 0. LN T and LN T denote the set of all non-leaf nodes and leaf nodes respectively. p(x) denotes the parent of the node x. att(x) is defined denotes the attribute associated with a leaf node x. The children of a node x are numbered from 1 to num x . index(z) denotes an index associated with the node z.
Satisfying an Access Tree: Let T x is a subtree rooted at the node x of T . T x (S) = 1 denotes the set of attributes S satisfies the access tree T x . If x is a leaf node, then T x (S) = 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ S. If x is a non-leaf node, T x (S) = 1 at least k x children of node x equal to 1.
Next, we will present the definition of fine-grained IB-BPRE and its semantic security model.
Definition 2 (Fine-Grained IB-BPRE):
A fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme comprises the following six algorithms:
• Setup(1 λ , N ) → (cp, msk): The Setup step takes the input of a security parameter λ and the maximum number of subscribers N . And the it outputs the master common parameters cp and the PKG's master private key msk.
• KeyGen(msk, ID) → sk ID : Using the master private key msk and an identity ID as input, The KeyGen algorithm outputs user's ID's private key sk ID .
• Enc(ID, M , S) → C: The input for Enc algorithms are: video M , the video owner's identity ID and a set of attributes S. The algorithms output the encrypted video C which can be shared with the subscribers later.
• ReKey(ID, sk ID , U , T ) → rk: The ReKey algorithm takes an identity ID, private key sk ID , a set of subscribers' identities U = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } and an access policy T as input. Outputs a re-encryption key rk. Note that, ID / ∈ U . In our scheme, the access policy is defined as an access tree. Details of the access tree can be found in [8] .
• ReEnc(C, rk) → CT: The ReEnc algorithm takes an original encrypted video C and a re-encryption key rk as input. Outputs the re-encrypted video CT.
• Dec(sk ID , C/CT) → M : The Dec algorithm takes a private key sk ID , an original encrypted/re-encrypted video C/CT as input. Outputs the video M . Consistency: The consistency of a fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme implies that the original encrypted video can be decrypted by the video owner and the re-encrypted video can be decrypted by the related subscriber. Formally, for a symmetric key K , (cp, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , N ), sk ID ← KeyGen(msk, ID) and rk ← ReKey(ID, sk ID , U , T ) we have Dec(sk ID , Enc(ID, K , S)) = K ;
where ID i ∈ U , and T (S) = 1. Note that, if an attribute set S satisfies the access policy T , then we define T (S) = 1. Otherwise T (S) = 0.
D. SEMANTIC SECURITY FOR FINE-GRAINED IB-BPRE
The semantic security for a fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme consists of the following two security games considering the semantic security of the original encrypted video and the re-encrypted video between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Definition 3 (Semantic-Or): A fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme is semantic secure of original ciphertext (Semantic-Or) if for all probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, the advantage in the following game is negligible. 1) Init. The adversary A sets the target subscriber's identity ID * and an attribute set S * . 2) Setup. At this stage, the challenger C receives the common public key cp and the master private key msk by running Setup(1 λ , N ). The algorithm returns cp to A. 3) Query phase I. The adversary A makes queries as below:
• KeyGen(ID i ): C executes sk ID i = KeyGen(cp, msk, ID i ), and returns sk ID i to A.
, and returns the re-encrypted video CT to A.
During this phase I, A should follow the restrictions as below:
-A is not allowed to query KeyGen(ID * ); -A cannot query ReKey(ID * , U , T ) and KeyGen(ID j ), if ID j ∈ U , and T (S * ) = 1. 4) Challenge. As soon as the query phase I is over, the attacker A outputs two AES symmetric keys (K 0 , K 1 ) with equal length. The challenger C randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenging ciphertext C * = Enc(ID * , K b , S * ) to A. 5) Query phase II. A continues querying with these restrictions: -A cannot query KeyGen(i) for any i ∈ S * ; -A cannot query ReKey(ID * , U , T ) and KeyGen(ID j ), if ID j ∈ U , and T (S * ) = 1; -A cannot query ReEnc(ID * , U , T , C * ) and KeyGen(ID j ) if ID j ∈ U and T (S * ) = 1; 6) Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b . The adver-
The adversary A's advantage in the above Semantic-Or game is defined as
Note that, the symbol P[E] denotes the probability of an event E. Definition 4 (Semantic-Re): A fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme is semantic secure of re-encrypted ciphertext (Semantic-re) if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage in the following game is negligible. 1) Init. The adversary A sets the target subscribers set U * and an attribute set set S * . 2) Setup. A challenger C runs Setup(1 λ , N ) to obtain the common public key cp and the master private key msk. Then it returns cp to A. 3) Query phase I. The adversary A makes the queries as follows:
• KeyGen(ID i ): If ID i ∈ U * , the challenger abort and returns an error symbol ⊥. Otherwise, executes sk ID i = KeyGen(cp, msk, ID i ), and returns sk ID i .
4)
Challenge. When the Query phase I is finished, the adversary A returns two AES symmetric keys (K 0 , K 1 ) with equal length. C randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns to the adversary A with the challenging ciphertext CT * = ReEnc(C, rk ID,T ,U * ), where ID / ∈ U * , and C = Enc(ID, K b , S * ), T (S * ) = 1.
5) Query phase II. A continues making queries as in
Query phase I. 6) Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b . The adver-
The adversary A's advantage in the above Semantic-Re game is defined as 
III. PRELIMINARIES A. NEGLIGIBLE FUNCTION
A function f : N −→ R is said to be negligible if for all positive integer x ∈ N there exists a n x ∈ N such that f (n) < n −x for all n > n x .
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order p, and u be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear pairing is a map e :
3) there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G 1 .
C. SECURITY ASSUMPTION
The (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE assumption [29] is defined as follows. Let (G 1 , G 2 , e, p) be a bilinear map group system, φ, ϕ be two co-prime polynomials with pairwise distinct roots of t and n. Let g 0 ∈ G 1 and h 0 ∈ G 1 . The (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE assumption means, given a vector − → y as (α) or an random element in G 2 with un-negligible advantage. Formally, for each PPT adversary A, the following probability is negligible:
where Q is a random element in G 2 .
D. TARGET COLLISION RESISTANT HASH FUNCTION
Given a random element x 1 from the domain of a hash function H, if there is no PPT adversary A can find an element x 2 where H(x 2 ) = H(x 1 ), then the hash function H is target collision resistant (TCR) [30] .
Formally, given an element x 1 , the probability is negligible:
where D is the domain of hash function H.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme and analyze its semantic security.
A. PROPOSED IB-BPRE SCHEME Out proposed IB-BPRE Scheme comprise the next six algorithms. 1) Setup(λ, N ): Given the security parameter λ and the maximum number of subscribers N , the bootstrap first setup a bilinear map [2] (e, p, g, G 1 , G 2 ). Then, chooses g, h, Z ∈ G 1 , α ∈ Z p randomly, and computes
. . , N } and ν = e(g, h). Chooses two target collision resistant hash functions:
p and setup the symmetric encryption algorithm AES. The common public key cp is cp =
, and the master secret key msk is msk = (α, h).
2) KeyGen(msk, ID): On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG computes
3) Enc(ID, M , S): On input a video M , an identity ID and an attribute set S. Chooses a random AES symmetric key K , and computes the AES ciphertext C M = AES_Enc(K , M ). Then chooses a random element t ∈ Z * p and computes
and a polynomial q x for each non-leaf node x in T . These polynomials are chosen in an recursion manner from top to down. It calls the procedure ReKey(T , H 3 (θ )/H 1 (ID)):
For each node x in the tree, set the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be d x = k x − 1. For the root r, set q r (0) = H 3 (θ) and d r other random points. For any other node x, set q x (0) = q p(x) (index(x)) and choose d x other random points randomly. Finally, for each leaf node x, sets ω = att(x). Then we compute the re-encryption in the following way.
For each leaf node x ∈ LN T , select a random value r x ∈ Z * p , and computes
Chooses a random value r ∈ Z * p and computes rk 1 = e(g, h) r · θ, rk 2 = h r 1 , rk 3 = g r· ID∈U (α+H 1 (ID)) .
Output the re-encryption key as 
Finally, computes VOLUME 7, 2019 Output the re-encrypted ciphertext CT = (C M , C K , C 2 , rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 ).
6) Dec(sk ID , C/CT):
a) If C is an original ciphertext. Computes
Then computes
Finally, computes M = AES_Dec(K , C M ). Consistency: 1) If C is an original ciphertext, then we have:
If CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext, then we have:
= e(g, h) r , θ = rk 1 · −1 , and K = C K · e(g, C 2 ) H 3 (θ ) .
Finally, the user can decrypt the AES ciphertext with the symmetric key K. Thus, the consistency of the proposed scheme is verified.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the security of our scheme. Our security analysis focus on the following three types of attacker.
1) The semi-honest cloud server. In our scheme, the videos in the cloud are all stored in the ciphertext form. The cloud with the re-encryption key can only convert the encrypted video to the subscribers' encrypted video. Only the with the vide owner's private key or the subscriber's private key, the video plaintext can be achieved. Thus, our proposed scheme can protect the video from a semi-honest cloud server. 2) A malicious subscriber. In the proposed scheme, the cloud can only convert the video owner's encrypted video to the subscriber's encrypted video with the reencryption key, which is generated by the video owner. Hence, a malicious subscriber cannot reveal the video without been authorized by the video owner.
3) A malicious subscriber colludes with the cloud server. In our scheme, though a malicious subscriber can collude with the cloud server to disclose the video plaintext. However, they can only achieve the video original for the subscriber. They cannot collude to disclose other honest subscriber's plaintext video. Thus, the proposed scheme can prevent the video owner and honest subscribers from the collusion attack. 4) Collusion resistant. Our proposed scheme is prevent the collusion resistant attack. In our scheme, when generating a re-encryption key, the delegator's private is randomized by a random element Z q x (0) · H 2 (ω) r x . A malicious cloud server collude with a set of delegatees can only reveal the value of sk·H 2 (ω) r x . The private key of a delegator is encoded by the random value H 2 (ω) r x . Thus, our proposed achieves the collusion resistant property.
C. SECURITY PROOF
Now, we describe the proof that the proposed fine-grained IB-BPRE scheme is semantic secure in the random oracle model. Proof: To begin with, suppose a PPT adversary A exists and it can break the Semantic-Or security, we are able to construct a simulator B to solve the (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE assumption. Given a (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE instance,
where φ(α) and ϕ(α) are two co-prime polynomials in α. For B, his task is to determine if Q ? = e(g 0 , h 0 ) r·φ(α) . The notations are defined as follows:
, B also keeps two records that are initially empty.
• sk list : is the private key (ID, sk ID ) tuples. • rk list : is the re-encryption key (ID, U , S, rk, δ) tuples, in which δ ∈ {0, 1} is a flag bit. If δ = 1, rk is a valid re-encryption key, otherwise when δ = 0, rk is a random value. The simulation process is as follows. 1) Init. The adversary A commits the target challenge identity ID * and attributes set S * .
2) Setup. The simulator B implicitly computes h = h φ(α) 0 , h) .
B also randomly selects ρ ∈ Z * p , then sets Z = h ρ·α·φ(α) 0 . B simulates H 1 and H 2 as follows. 
4) Challenge. As soon as Phase I is done, the adversary
A returns two equal AES symmetric keys (K 0 , K 1 ). B randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and computes
B also computes
Finally, for each ω * ∈ S, B computes
B output the challenge ciphertext
If Q is a random value in G 2 , the challenge ciphertext C * is independent of b from the attacker's view. Proof: Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that is able to break the Semantic-Re security of the scheme, We can build a simulator B to solve the (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE assumption. Given a (φ, ϕ, )-GDDHE instance,
where φ(α) and ϕ(α) are two coprime polynomials in α. B's task is to determine if Q ? = e(g 0 , h 0 ) r·φ(α) . The notations are described as follows
• sk list : is the private key (ID, sk ID ) tuples. • rk list : is the re-encryption key (ID, U , S, rk, δ) tuples, in which δ ∈ {0, 1} is a flag bit, δ = 1 denotes rk is a valid re-encryption key and δ = 0 denotes rk is a random value. Here is the description of the simulation process: h) .
. B simulates H 1 and H 2 as follows.
• H 1 queries: B sets entry (ID * , λ t+1 ) and B output the challenge ciphertext CT * = (C K * , C * 2 , rk * 1 , rk * 2 , rk * 3 ). Note that, if Q = e(g 0 , h 0 ) r·φ(α) , we have
and
If Q is a random value from G 2 , the challenge ciphertext C * is independent of b from the adversary's perspective. According to the semantic security definition and the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we proofed Theorem 1.
D. A CCA SECURE CONSTRUCTION OF IB-BPRE
In this subsection, we present a CCA secure construction of IB-BPRE. We leverage the technique of Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [31] .
1) Setup(λ, N ): Given the security parameter λ and the maximum number of subscribers N , the bootstrap first setup a bilinear map (e, p, g, G 1 , G 2 ). Then, chooses g, h, Z ∈ G 1 , α ∈ Z p randomly, and computes h 1 = h α , g i = g α i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and ν = e(g, h). Chooses two target collision resistant hash functions:
, 1} * and setup the symmetric encryption algorithm AES. The common public key cp is cp = (G 1 , G 2 , e, p, ν, g, g i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, h 1 , Z , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , AES), and the master secret key msk is msk = (α, h).
2) KeyGen(msk, ID): On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG computes sk ID = h 1/(α+H 1 (ID)) .
3) Enc(ID, M , S): On input a video M , an identity ID and an attribute set S. Chooses a random AES symmetric key K , and computes the AES ciphertext C M = AES_Enc(K , M ). Then chooses a random element R ∈ G 2 and computes t = H 1 (R, K ), C 0 = K ⊕ H 4 (R),
For each ω ∈ S, computes C ω = H 2 (ω) t . Finally
4) ReKey(ID, sk ID , U , T ): Randomly chooses θ ∈ G 2 and a polynomial q x for each non-leaf node x in T . These polynomials are chosen in an recursion manner from top to down. It calls the procedure ReKey(T , H 3 (θ )/H 1 (ID)):
For each node x in the tree, set the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be d x = k x − 1. For the root r, set q r (0) = H 3 (θ) and d r other random points. For any other node x, set q x (0) = q p(x) (index(x)) and choose d x other random points randomly. Finally, for each leaf node x, sets ω = att(x). Then we compute the re-encryption in the following way. For each leaf node x ∈ LN T , select a random value r x ∈ Z * p , and computes
Output the re-encryption key as Otherwise, defines a recursive algorithms NodeReEnc(C, rk, x) that takes input an original ciphertext C, the re-encryption key rk, and a node x in the tree and works as follows. The cloud server fist checks whether the following conditions hold:
If one of the verifications fails, it aborts and outputs ⊥. 
Finally, computes
Output the re-encrypted ciphertext CT = (C M , C 0 , C R , C 2 , rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 ).
6) Dec(sk ID , C/CT):
a) If C is an original ciphertext. Checks whether equations (1) − (2) hold, if the verifications fail, aborts and outputs ⊥. Otherwise computes R = C R ·e(sk ID , C 1 ) −1 , K = C 0 ⊕ H 4 (R), t = H 1 (R, K ), and checks whether
Then computes θ = rk 1 · −1 , R = C R · e(g, C 2 ) H 3 (θ ) , K = C 0 ⊕ H 4 (R), t = H 1 (R, K ), and checks whether C 2 = Z t holds. If yes, returns K . Otherwise returns ⊥. Finally, computes M = AES_Dec(K , C M ).
V. PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION A. FUNCTIONALITY AND SECURITY COMPARISON
In this subsection, we compare the proposed scheme with the most recent two identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption schemes [26] , [27] in terms of functionality and security. The comparison is listed in Table 1 . Table 1 reveals that only our proposed scheme achieves the broadcast, fine-grained properties and CCA security.
B. THEORETICAL COMPARISON
We also compare the proposed scheme with the previous two identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption schemes [26] , [27] regarding the computation cost. The comparison is listed in Table 2 . In Table 2 S, T and U represent the size of the attribute set S, an access tree T and the number of subscribers in the broadcast encryption respectively. Let e be the computation cost of an exponential in a group and p be the computation cost of a bilinear pairing. We omit the computation cost of a hash function since it is much less than the computation cost of the exponential and bilinear pairing computation. Table 2 reveals that our scheme is as efficient as [26] and [27] in Enc, ReEnc and Dec(Re) algorithms. In the ReKey algorithm, our scheme is a bit less efficient than [26] and [27] . However, this makes sense as our scheme provides the fine-grained access control on encrypted data which is note achieved in both [27] and [26] . In our scheme, an access policy is introduced in the ReKey algorithm to achieve the fine-grained property. The only overhead cost is introduced by adding the access policy.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
For the implementation of our scheme, we use the PBC package [32] which is written in Golang. The PBC package offers structures for building pairing-based cryptosystems. The hardware has an Intel i5-8250U CPU @ 1.60GHZ and a 8GB RAM with Linux Mint 18.1. We use the GO 1.9 programming language.
In the PBC library, we set the elliptic curve to be Y 2 = X 3 + X with 160 bit group order. we run every experiment for 100 times to calculate the average execution time.
The broadcast subscribers' size is set to be U = 20 in our experiment. We varied the attribute set size |S| from 30 to 70 with step 10. Table 3 summarizes the run time of the steps executed by the user and the proxy. Table 3 also demonstrates that the execution time of Dec(Or) and Dec(Re) algorithms are constant. For Enc, RKeyGen and ReEnc algorithms, their execution time is linear to the size of S. Overall, the experiment results demonstrate the theoretical analysis in Table 2 .
D. EXECUTE TIME COMPARISON
In this experiment, we compare our scheme with [26] and [27] in original ciphertext decryption algorithm Dec(Or) and re-encrypted ciphertext decryption algorithm Dec(Re) algorithms as these algorithms are executed on the subscriber's side. We varied the subscribers' size |U | from 20 to 60 with step 10. The execute time comparisons are showed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. Figure 4 shows that, our scheme is almost as efficient as [26] and [27] in algorithm Dec(Re). Regarding to the Dec(Or) algorithm computation time, shown in Figure 3 , the computation time of the schemes [26] and [27] grow linear with the size of the subscribers set. The Dec(Or) algorithm computation time of our scheme is much less than [26] and [27] . Moreover, the Dec(Or) algorithm computation time of our scheme is constant.
Overall, the performance evaluations show that our scheme is more efficient than the previous schemes [26] and [27] on the subscriber's side. Through, our scheme is a bit less efficient in the ReKey algorithm, the small overhead is introduced due to the added access policy on the encrypted data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the security and privacy problems of the exist micro-video system and presented the notion of fine-grained identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption. A concrete scheme is presented with the proposed notion. Furthermore, we have proven that the proposed scheme is semantic secure with random oracles. While this work has solved the issues of secure micro-video subscribing, there are still some interesting problems to be solved in the micro video subscribing system such as designing fine-grained identitybased proxy re-encryption schemes with hidden identities. This is critical for the micro-video subscribing scenario as the video owner may not want to disclose his subscribers.
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